Hithium’s second A1 submission with the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKSE) shows all the usual signs of an inexperienced company; for example, Hithium’s lack of direction and discipline. And as you go through the filing, the picture of a company operating out of its depth becomes clear as day. The filing is reminiscent of a business unsure whether to keep chasing the illusion of rapid expansion or face the financial reality beneath it. The company’s most recent A1 submission exposes the same financial chaos that doomed its last attempt.
For those unaware, Hithium has failed to go public twice, once in 2023 and then again in 2025. Each of those attempts ended the same way: no listing, no offering, and without the much-needed cash injection. Despite that, Hithium seems to reject learning from its past mistakes by continuing to push ahead, hiding behind ever-growing subsidies and bad PR spin. While reality is simple, Hithium is running out of time and money.
By now, Hithium’s IPO attempts sounds like a broken record on its last legs. It’s almost impressive how brutal the numbers are. Hithium’s trade receivables turnover days exploded to 227.9 compared to just 11.8 in 2022; payables turnover sits at 226.1 days, up from 96.3 in 2023; customers are now taking on average 7 months to pay up; and inventory doubled to RMB 4.3 billion in a year, proof that production keeps outpacing demand. Whether it is reckless credit or fake growth, Hithium looks less like a business and more like a company trapped in its own debt cycle; if the supplier demanded upfront payment or increased their prices, it could wipe out Hithium’s thin 13% margin overnight.
Hithium’s reported pre-tax profit of RMB 152 million in H1 2025 depends on RMB 334 million in government subsidies. Without those government handouts, it would be losing money. Hithium’s gross margin has fallen to 13.1%, down from a mediocre 17.9% from just a year ago. Their supposed profit is nothing but a smoke and mirrors, built on state support.
At the same time, the company remains silent on some of its most pressing liabilities. There is no mention of the Texas plant, which was once promoted to be Hithium’s flagship Western manufacturing hub in the USA and has now simply become a million-dollar sunk cost and geopolitical liability. While global sales expansion are prominently featured in the prospectus, there is no mention in the filing of the loss of Hithium’s largest overseas customer, Powin, whose bankruptcy wiped out more than $200 million in expected orders. Nor is there mention that nearly half of the company’s revenue depends on just five overseas clients who at any moment could be banned from doing business with a CCP-linked enterprise like Hithium.
Hithium’s strategy relies on stretching credit, hoarding unsold goods, and cashing government checks to stay alive. Its debt is shooting through the roof; its liquidity is evaporating, and investors are starting to question the company. Its largest U.S. customer has gone bankrupt, and its overseas revenue is shrinking. At the end of the day it might be a new A1 filing, but the same red flags, only this time the risks are bigger.
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